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and dignified manner, and that proper decorum is maintained in the
court room while a trial is under way.7
The hearing judge concluded that with the aid of modern devices
in the fields of photography, radio and television, court room pro-
ceedings can be publicized in such manner without the slightest amount
of disturbance. He recognized that: photographs may be obtained
without flashbulbs or excessive equipment; television cameras can be
placed outside the court room with only the lens appearing through the
wall or through a closed booth in the rear of the court room; ordinary
lighting of the court room is sufficient; microphones could be placed
inconspicuously so as not to distract a witness who is testifying.
Protection against non-use or misuse of modern equipment is found
in the discretionary power to prohibit which is left in the hands of the
judge.
The provisos required by the hearing judge appear to give adequate
protection to witnesses and jurors who might in some manner be so
disturbed by court room photographing, broadcasting or televising that
justice would be affected.
The Colorado attitude will certainly give wider publicity to the
defendant and his predicament. Possibly the defendant can complain,
but Canon 35 does not seem primarily designed to protect the privacy
of a defendant.
The qualifications of Canon 35 which Colorado is willing to sanction
do not seem likely to detract from the dignity of court proceedings,
distract witnesses and jurors or create misconceptions in the mind
of the public.
PAUL LUCIE
Constitutional Law - Discharge of Public School Teacher Be-
cause of a Refusal to Testify - On September 24, 1952, the Internal
Security Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary of the
United States Senate held open hearings in New York City. The in-
vestigation, conducted on a national scale, related to subversive influ-
ences in American education. The appellant, Harry Slochower, a
member of the faculty of Brooklyn College, stated before the Com-
mittee that he was willing to answer all questions relating to his associ-
ations and political beliefs since 1941. He did, however, refuse to
testify concerning his association memberships in 1940 and 1941 on the
ground that his answers might tend to incriminate him. As a result he
was suspended from his teaching position and three days later his
position was declared vacant "pursuant to the provisions of Section
903 of the NEW YORK CITY CHARTER." This section provides, in
In re Greene, 160 F.2d 517 (3d Cir. 1947).
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part, for summary dismissal for any City employee who refuses to
testif) before a legislative committee on the grounds of self incri-
mination.' The Court of Appeals of New York affirmed the lower
court's decision that the appellant's behavior fell within the scope of
Sec. 903 and upheld its application to Slochower. Held: Reversed: The
New York City Charter provisions terminating employment of any
city employee who utilizes the privilege against self-incrimination to
avoid answering questions relating to his official conduct violates the
Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause. Mr. Justice Reed, with
whom Mr. Justice Burton and Mr. Justice Minton join, dissenting,
while agreeing that the duty to respond may be refused for personal
protection against prosecution, states that such avoidance of public
duty to furnish information can properly be considered to stamp the
employee unfit to hold certain official positions. Mr. Justice Harlan,
in a separate dissent, maintains that the Statute bears reasonable rela-
tion to New York's interest in insuring the qualifications of teachers.
Slochower v. Board of Higher Education of City of New York
350 US 551, 100 L. Ed. 692, 76 S. Ct. 637 (1956).
The majority opinion, written by Mr. Justice Clark, affirms the
well established rule that a person engaged in government employment
must comply with reasonable standards laid down by the proper author-
ities. Two recent decisions: Adler v. Board of Education and Garner
v. Los Angeles Board,2 involving the loyalty of school teachers are
cited with approval by the Court. Adler v. Board of Education held
valid the New York Feinberg Law which authorized school authorities
to dismiss employees after notice and hearing who were found to have
violated the Civil Service Law which condemns those who "willfully
and deliberately advocate, advise or teach the doctrine that the govern-
ment of the United States or of any state or of any political subdivi-
sion thereof should be overthrown or overturned by force, violence
or any unlawful means" 3 or who were not able to satisfactorily explain
1 The full text of Sec. 903 provides:
"If any councilman or other officer or employee of the city shall, after law-
ful notice or process, willfully refuse or fail to appear before any court orjudge, any legislative committee, or any officer, board or body authorized to
conduct any hearing or inquiry, or having appeared shall refuse to testify or to
answer any questions regarding the property, government or affairs of the city
or of any county included within its territorial limits, or regarding the nomin-
ation, election, appointment or official conduct of any officer or employee of the
city or of any such county, on the ground that this answer would tend to in-
criminate him or shall refuse to waive immunity from prosecution on account
of any such matter in relation to which he maybe asked to testify upon any
such hearing or inquiry, his term or tenure of office or employment shall term-
inate and such office or employment shall be vacant, and he shall not be eligible
to election or appointment to any office or employment under the city or any
agency."
2 Garner v. Board of Public Works, 341 U.S. 716, 95 L.Ed. 1317, 71 S.Ct. 909
(1950) ; Adler v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 485, 96 L.Ed. 517, 72 S.Ct. 380,
27 A.L.R. 472 (1951).
3 N.Y. LAWS 1949, Ch. 360, §12a.
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membership in certain organizations found to have that aim. The case
of Garner v. Los Angeles Board concerned a city ordinance which
required all employees to execute an affidavit "stating whether or not
he is or ever was a member of a Communist Party of the United
States of America or of the Communist Political Association, and if
he is or was such a member, stating the dates when he became, and
during which he was, such a member .... -4 The Court held the statute
valid on the grounds that the city could "reasonably inquire of its
employees as to matters that may prove relevant to their fitness and
suitability for the public service." 5
The Court distinguishes the case under review by finding that the
requirements of Sec. 903, the ordinance in question, are not reasonable.
The majority points out that there must be a compliance with due
process which has as its basis "the protection of the individual from
arbitrary action." 6 The Court sees "arbitrary action" in an automatic
dismissal of one who shall refuse to testify or to answer any question
before a legislative committee concerning his official conduct and notes
that Sec. 903 falls squarely within the prohibition of Wieman v.
Updegraff.7 In that case a so-called "loyalty oath" was held invalid
because it weighed employability on the fact of membership in certain
organizations and did not recognize that membership might be innocent.
The Court expressed the following opinion:
"A state servant may have joined a prescribed organization
unaware of its activities and purposes. In recent years many
completely loyal persons have severed organizational ties after
learning for the first time of the character of groups to which
they had belonged."
In the instant case the Court finds a parallel situation. The use of Sec.
903 is interpreted to mean a "conclusive presumption of guilt." The
court announces that "since no inference of guilt was possible from the
claim (of the privilege) before the federal committee, the discharge
falls of its own weight as wholly without support."9 The latter state-
ment finds support in the very recent case of Ullman v. United States,10
where the Court without reservation announced that the claim of privi-
lege was for the innocent as well as the guilty:
"Too many, even those who should be better advised, view
this privilege as a shelter for wrong doers. They too readily
4 Supra, n. 1, 341 U.S. at p. 719.
5 Ibid. at p. 720.
6 350 U.S. at p. 559. The Court here is quoting Mr. Justice Cardago in Ohio Bell
Tel. Co. v. Public Utilities Comm. 301 U.S. 292, 302, 81 L.Ed. 1093, 1100, 57
S.Ct. 724.
344 U.S. 183, 97 L.Ed. 216.
5 Ibid., 344 U.S. at p. 190.
9 Supra, n. 6 at p. 559.
10 350 U.S. 422, 100 L.Ed. 511, 76 S.Ct. 497.
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assume that those who invoke it are either guilty of crime or
commit perjury in claiming the privilege. Such a view does
scant honor to the patriots who sponsored the Bill of Rights as
a condition to acceptance of the CONSTITUTION by the ratifying
States.""
If Slochower was dismissed on the basis of a conclusive presump-
tion of guilt of his asserting of the privilege then there seems little
question as to the invalidity of Sec. 903 when, considered in light of
the above mentioned recent decisions.
The four dissenting justices take a different view of the effect of
the statute. The dissenters look upon the statute as a reasonable re-
quirement to cooperate with any investigation concerning his official
conduct. Mr. Justice Reed's dissenting opinion asserts that "the duty
to respond may be refused for personal protection only, but such
avoidance of public duty to furnish information can properly be con-
sidered to stamp the employee as a person unfit to hold certain official
positions.' 2 Mr. Justice Harlan in his separate dissent specifically
agrees with the majority's position that no inference of membership in
the Communist Party may be drawn from the assertion of one's
privilege against self incrimination but finds that the statute bears a
reasonable relation to New York's interest in ensuring the qualifications
of its teachers. This writer finds the position expressed by Mr. justice
Harlan most persuasive:
"This court has already held, however, that a state may
properly make knowing membership in an organization dedi-
cated to the overthrow of the government by force a ground
for disqualification from public school teaching. Adler v.
Board of Education, 342 U.S. 485, 96 L. Ed. 517, 72 S. Ct. 380,
2 N.A.L.R. 2d 472. A requirement that public school teachers
shall furnish information as to their past or present membership
in the Communist party is a relevant step in the implementation
of such a state policy, and a teacher may be discharged for re-
fusing to comply with that requirement. Garner v. Board of
Public Works, 341 U.S. 716, 95 L. Ed. 1317. Moreover, I think
that a State may justifiably consider that teachers who refuse to
answer questions concerning their official conduct are no longer
qualified for public school teaching, on the ground that their
refusal to answer jeopardizes the confidence that the public
should have in its school system. On either view of the statute,
I think Dr. Slochower's discharge did not violate due process."' 3
The position of the court in Adler v. Board of Education and
Garner v. Los Angeles' 4 seems to support the dissenting opinions.
It is difficult to understand what basis could be used to distinguish
a1 Ibid., 350 U.S. at pp. 426-27.
12 Supra, n. 6 at pp. 562-3.
3 Ibid., n. 6 350 U.S. at p. 566.
14 Supra, n. 2.
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the reasonableness of a requirement which denies employment because
of membership in groups known to be listed by the Attorney General
as subversive or a requirement which denies employment because of a
refusal to give information to school authorities concerning affiliations
with Communist groups from the requirement in the instant case of
cooperation with a properly authorized governmental body investi-
gating official conduct.
There has been an analogous line of cases which has arisen in
several different states which have dealt with police and law enforce-
ment officials. Some of these cases such as Drury v. Hurley1 and
Sounder v. City of Philadelphia6 involved police officers who were
charged with "conduct unbecoming an officer" because of refusals
to testify before grand juries. In both cases the officers' discharges
were approved. The courts found "that the refusal to testify was
not only a breach of the officers' duty and responsibility but also a
breach of the confidence and trust the public had a right to impose
in such officials. 1 7 Other police discharge cases have arisen under
express statutory and constitutional provisions requiring police officers
to testify when called before grand juries. Representative of these are
Cantaline v. McClellon s and Cristal v. Police Commission of the City
and County of San Francisco.19 The California Court stated:
"As we view the situation, when pertinent questions were
propounded to the appellants before the grand jury, the answers
to which questions would tend to incriminate them, they were
put to a choice which they voluntarily made. Duty required
them to answer. Privilege permitted them to refuse to answer.
They chose to exercise the privilege, but the exercise of the
privilege was wholly inconsistent with their duty as police offi-
cers. They clearly had a constitutional right to refuse to answer
under the circumstances, but it is certain that they had no con-
stitutional right to remain police officers in face of their clear
violation of the duty placed upon them. 1 2
0
These cases seem, in this writer's view, to be properly decided. Under
the reasoning of the majority in the case under review these decisions
would seem to be incorrect unless the court would be willing to say
that corruption in police circles is more dangerous to legally constituted
government than Communism in teaching circles or that police have
15 Drury v. Hurley, 339 Ill. App. 33, 88 N.E.2d 728 (1949).
16 Sounder v. City of Philadelphia, 305 Pa. 1, 156 Att. 245 (1931).
17 Comment: Right of an Employer to Discharge an Employee for Refusal to
Testify Before a Congressional Committee on the Ground of Self-incrimina-
tion, 38 MARQ. L. REV. 8 at p. 21 (1954).
is Cantaline v. McClellen, 282 N.Y. 166, 25 N.E.2d 972, Affirming 258 App. Div.
314, 16 N.Y.2d 792 (1940).
'D Cristal v. Police Commissioner of the City and County of San Francisco, 33
Col.App. 564, 92 P.2d 416 (1939).
20 Ibid., 92 P.2d at p. 419.
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any greater duty to cooperate with and support proper inquiries than
teachers do. These views seem patently false.2 1
The Communist danger is very real. Teachers are in an area where
the influence of communistic ideologies could be most dangerous to our
society. A public school teacher who refuses to cooperate with in-
vestigations into communistic activities in education, it would seem,
breaches the confidence and trust which the public has a right to im-
pose upon such teachers. The use of the privilege does not brand
a teacher a communist per se but it certainly does brand him as a per-
son who grossly disregards his country's best interests by refusing to
cooperate with investigations into the Communist Party's attempts to
infiltrate the teaching profession. It would seem that a community
could reasonably make such cooperation a requirement for employment.
This philosophy seems to be in accord with the courts position in
Adler v. Board of Education:
"A teacher works in a sensitive area in a schoolroom. There
he shapes the attitude of young minds towards the society in
which they live. In this, the state has a vital concern. It must
preserve the integrity of the schools. That the school authorities
have the right and the duty to screen the officials, teachers, and
employees as to their fitness to maintain the integrity of the
schools as a part of ordered society can not be doubted. One's
associates, past and present, as well as one's conduct, may
properly be considered in determining fitness and loyalty.
22
CLAUDE KoRDus
21 The argument that these cases are not relevant because the forum was not a
state body directly interested in employment qualifications does not seem to be
in point to this writer who is in substantial agreement with the opinion of Mr.
Justice Harlan expressed in the case under review, 350 U.S. at p. 567.
"Dr. Slochower cannot discriminate between forums in deciding whether or not
to answer a proper and relevant question, if the State requires him to answer
before every lawfully constituted body. Here the information sought to be
elicited from Dr. Slochower could have been considered by State Authorities
in reviewing Dr. Slochower's qualifications, and the effect of his claim of
privilege on the public confidence in its school system was at least as great as
it would have been had his refusal to answer been before a state legislative
committee.
22 Supra, n. 2, 342 U.S. at p. 494.
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